

STAT

June 12, 1968

SUBJECT: Politico-Military Game MU I-68 - Film and Commentary

- Chief, NE Division, DDP
- Member, Bd of National Estimates
- Chief, OCI/CA/MEA

The Hon. Joseph W. Barr - Under Sec. of Treasury
The Hon. Paul C. Warnke - Asst Sec. of Def. for ISA
Adm. Thomas H. Moorer - CNO
Gen. Leonard F. Chapman, Jr. - Commandant, USMC
Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter - Director, NSA

CIA Liaison for Games & Exercises

(EXECUTIVE REPORT FILE

MEMORANDUM FOR: *Ex 1. Assnt.*

*How about shopping
this with BNE, DDI and
DDP for interest.*

*Off hand I would
think a BNE rep. and
perhaps Jim Pitchfield
would be appropriate.*



6/5/68
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)



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Executive Registry
168-1681/3

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

5 JUN 1968

Dear Dick,

You and one or two key members of your staff are cordially invited to join with me to review a video summary and commentary of MU I-68. This was an interagency, politico-military game dealing with emerging trends in the Middle East and their impact upon United States foreign policy and objectives in a near time frame. The review will be presented from 1330 to 1500 hours on Thursday, 27 June, in Room 5C-1042, the Pentagon. Those individuals listed in the enclosure have also been invited to attend.

I look forward to your personal review of this film briefing and to your participation in the ensuing discussion. An opportunity to share your views concerning this critical region would substantially enhance the value of the review to all in attendance. The atmosphere will be informal and a policy of non-attribution will be rigidly observed.

The Joint War Games Agency point of contact is Lt Colonel Lyle E. Mann, USAF, OXford 5-7683, to whom your attendance may be confirmed.

Sincerely,

Bues

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure
a/s

The Honorable Richard M. Helms
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

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LIST OF ADDRESSEES

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Washington, D. C. 20500

The Honorable
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The Secretary of State
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Washington, D. C. 20520

The Honorable
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Washington, D. C. 20451

The Honorable
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Administrator, Agency for International
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Washington, D. C. 20523

The Honorable
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The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Treasury Department
Washington, D. C. 20220

The Honorable
Richard M. Helms
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
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The Honorable
Leonard H. Marks
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The Honorable
Paul C. Warnke
Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs
The Department of Defense
Washington, D. C. 20301

The Honorable
Phil G. Goulding
Assistant Secretary of Defense
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Admiral Thomas H. Moorer
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Commander in Chief
United States Strike Command
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Commander in Chief, Atlantic
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Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter, USA
Director, National Security Agency
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755
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MEMORANDUM

Date 15 May 1968

To: Exer-Dir

Subject: MU I-68

Enclosed is a brief summary and commentary on a politico-military game conducted in the Pentagon from 26 April to 14 May. The game was directed by Mr. Rodger P. Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, and addressed problems this nation faces in the Middle East.



W. H. BIRDSONG
Brigadier General, USA
Chief, Joint War Games Agency

Attachment
a/s (S-NF)

GROUP-3
Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
Not automatically declassified.

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POLITICO-MILITARY GAME

MU I-68

Conducted on an interagency basis by the Joint War Games Agency, OJCS.
Written Final Report and 25-minute Film Summary available 15 June 1968.

INITIAL SETTING: 29 April 1969 - US troop commitments in Vietnam remain heavy - Soviet influence in Middle East grows - Arab armies rebuilt to pre-June '67 levels.

Terrorist activities abate in Jordan Valley in summer '68 - Fatah leaders, with grave reservations, agree to let negotiations begin on Rhodes - talks achieve initial success in forging agreement between Israel and the UAR leading to opening of Suez Canal - make little further progress - terrorist leaders become restive.

In March 1969, terrorism festers again as band hits Shemona from bases in Lebanon - Israel threatens counteraction - Israeli freighter denied passage of canal on 27 April.

RESULTING CRISIS: Fatah agents liberate and arm 1500 Arab prisoners - 300 Israelis killed as Arabs escape into Jordan - on 28 April, four Israeli brigades push into Irbid Heights in reprisal.

Israel expands salient south to Salt - ten miles from Amman - determines to retain newly gained territory as buffer to terrorism - asks US not to interfere in UN.

US informs Israel unable to support invasion - votes condemnation of Israel in Security Council - urges Israel to withdraw.

Arabs feel climate of world opinion favorable - USSR will support Arabs - US will not support Israel - common threat drives Arabs to unity of action - resolve to mount combined and concerted counter-attack to repel Israelis - USSR counsels Arabs against military action and exerts political pressures to bring about cease-fire and Israeli withdrawal.

Arabs launch attack two days early as original plans for 10 May leak - pre-empt against Israeli air assets - achieve considerable success - destroy all but three days of aviation fuel - Israelis hurl back Arab ground thrust - march on Amman and Damascus.

US and USSR see their respective clients threatened - domestic pressures mount on US Administration to help Israel - US offers air cover if Israel agrees to cease-fire and withdrawal - as a political move, USSR lands two battalions of naval infantry at Latakia.

Cease-fire imposed - Arabs and Israelis move to negotiations on Rhodes - initial round produces some grounds for agreement but status of Jerusalem still a crunch point.

CRITIQUE HIGHLIGHTS: US players felt relatively aloof stance regarding Israeli realistic - took account of American political realities - felt Israelis would be tough to handle - decided to be tough also - wanted to avoid confrontation with Soviets - rejected military intervention not because of lack of assets, but because they couldn't see what it would buy them.

Israeli team members felt most objectives achieved - didn't cave to any great extent on negotiating issues - could afford to give up on face-to-face talks to gain US support - estimated that pre-emption would be more costly than June '67 - Israel could weather Arab pre-emption - felt loss of air assets might force US support.

Arab players felt unity of action realistic - Arabs had no place to go - people demanded action - even a loss would not be damaging if Arab forces at least made a stand - recognized that fissures might appear if conflict protracted.


Soviet team viewed behavior of clients as irritating - but Soviets had to support Arabs so as not to lose them - privately, team did not want Israel to go down - presence of Israel serves their purposes.

Change in balance of power - even a limited Arab victory - would alter negotiating demands of both sides - US and USSR both recognized requirement might exist to impose a settlement - both preferred such action be more multilateral - Soviets, under pressure of crisis, would cooperate initially - but then seek renewal of turbulence.

US and USSR teams both feared confrontation - tended to overrate each other's military potential in the Middle East - US constrained by effects intervention might have on US interests in the Arab states.

Game seemed to ask anew two questions - is there real danger of US/ USSR confrontation in the Middle East or is it possible to negotiate a settlement of the Arab/Israeli conflict?

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19 APR 1968

*we don't have
a copy of 1681.*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Joint War Games Agency, OJCS

SUBJECT: CIA Participation in MU I-68

1. The following officers have been nominated to participate as
players in MU I-68:

25X1



2. All of the above-named officers have TOP SECRET security
clearances.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS:

15 APR 1968


Sign



25X1

cc: Ex. Asst/DDCI

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1. Ex. Asst/DDCI
Room 7D5615

4/23

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